Towards the end of 2007 the College of Eastern Europe in Wrocław published a book which is the result of 13 interviews of well-known Belarusian intellectuals by two young Polish journalists.1 The views presented by the Belarusians are not representative — which is completely understandable — of the Belarusian intellectual circles nor can they represent the whole Belarusian society. Most of the Belarusian interviewees are persons who oppose the current Belarusian authorities and who emphasize their often differently understood Belarusianness, looking favorably on Europe. However, and it seems to be a positive phenomenon, there are also representatives of Belarusian cultural life and the media who have completely different views. Obviously, it is not really possible in such a short text to analyze the whole of the views represented by the Belarusian interviewees. I decided to choose those that seem both particularly interesting and — as it may be assumed — constitute important elements of their Belarusian identity. The subject of the conversation was imposed by the Polish journalists, who usually tried to ask their Belarusian interviews about the areas that were of interest both to them and the interviewers as well as subjects they were familiar with. The views are often expressed in an extremely unambiguous way, which is the result of both the writers’ and artists’ professional non-conformism and, possibly, sometimes, of a planned didactic purpose. The contents of the book can be treated in a twofold way, as a representation of Belarusians’ identity looking at themselves and their homeland but also — in a more or less subjective way — as a description of particular processes taking place in Belarus in the past and now.
Reading the interviews I was interested in the Belarusians’ ways of perceiving their communality and the categories ascribed to it as well as their relations to their state, language, history, today’s Russia and the former USSR. I was interested in such questions as the visions of Belarus and Belarusianness created by them, their identity and the differences between us, Poles, and them, Belarusians. Before the book discussed here was published, another book treating about the same subjects and edited by Belarusians appeared (published in three languages, Belarusian, English and Russian, although the place of publication is Warsaw2). Belarusian intellectuals answered there the same set of questions, however, without being able to modify and deepen them and react to the answers. Despite the fact that it is an interesting and informative book, it seems that the method of direct interviews renders much better results, allowing one to avoid clichés, misinterpretation and helping to develop subjects that turned out to be particularly fruitful during the conversation.
One may wonder then to what extent Belarusian national communality is developed and what unites it. There are not many direct answers to such questions in the book and there are few generalizing and synthesizing statements based on reliable historical and sociological data (this is not, however, a criticism of the book since it is not an academic treatise). Many of the interviewees, at the same time, mention several examples confirming the Sovietization of the Belarusian society; these opinions indicate the complete indifference of the Belarusian people toward Belarusian culture. What stands out among these opinions are the words of the Russian-speaking journalist Piotr Marcau (Marcev), since 2002 the editor of a well-known journal „Belorusskaia Delovaia Gazeta:” „How can a Belarusian person feel like a real citizen — asks Marcau — without knowing his country’s history? And that was the case in the USSR. (…) No history manual offers a single word of explanation why Belarusians are actually Belarusians. There is a subconscious sense of the loss of identity in the society. Without knowing his or her history, state and nation, one cannot consciously say: I am Belarusian. The whole modern Belarusian culture is related to the pain of experiencing such a loss. But I would not say that the complex is related to having no values. This is hidden pain, resulting from losing self-awareness. I cannot explain in a different way why even during the Soviet times Belarusians felt they were a separate nation, despite the fact that this was the most russified republic in the whole empire” (pp. 187-188). Ales’ Ancipenka, a media expert and a philosopher representing the middle generation, offers a corresponding view: „The problem of contemporary Belarusians — Ancipenka observes — is related to two areas: Belarusian national identity which has not completely developed yet and the mentality of homo sovieticus. The current regime is fighting to protect homo sovieticus and that is why the forming of nation — understood from the modern perspective — is suspended but not stopped” (p. 110).
The consequence of the country’s Russification/Sovietization has been the historical ease with which Belarusians have been assimilating and merging with Russianness in Moscow and Saint Petersburg (Leningrad), and demonstrating their separateness (Belarusianness) in Lublin and Warsaw. A controversial thesis is put forward by Henadz Buraukin, a journalist, writer and poet of the older generation, once Moscow’s „Pravda” newspaper correspondent in Belarus and representative of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic at United Nations. According to him, Belarusian national awareness developed during World War II and in the subsequent years and the context of his arguments suggests that he means decades following World War II (p. 65). But in fact these years are more synonymous with Sovietization and destroying the culture and Belarusian language than with Belarusianisation, which is connected with developing national identity. One may wonder about historical context here. The war opened the Belarusians partly to the world, evoked emotions not known earlier on such a scale and led to the process of mental and material modernization; this is what Buraukin may to some extent mean by the development of national identity. As a result of this Belarusians left their small, local communities, so called „localness.” Another perceptive on the war was the perspective of the Belarusian peasantry and the turmoil accompanying it, represented by the clash of two streams: communist and national. The national stream, supporting Hitler’s occupying forces during the war became synonymous with nationalism and fascism, which continues to have quite negative consequences for Belarus. It may be assumed that „national” — according to the terminology — communality, is perceived by Buraukin also through the primacy of Belarusian society’s modernization, which was once almost completely rural. This is a post-war perspective related to people migrating to towns and cities left by the Jews as well as to mass social advancement. Broadening intellectual horizons may associated with the development of national identity. However, one needs to remember that not every „supra-village” awareness is synonymous with national awareness and that not every community constitutes a nation.
Some Belarusian intellectuals perceive a considerable clash between them and the common people, related both to the cultural and, to some extent, national area. Some of them make quite strong statements, suggesting that they feel locked in a cultural ghetto. The ideologists of Belarusian renaissance — writes Valancin Akudovich, a Belarusian philosopher, poet and essayist of the middle generation — „could only relate to the peasant, who did not care at all about all the stories about the nation” (p. 160). „The intelligentsia — he goes on to say — was developing based on a cultural canon whereas the workers based their values on social issues. That led to the clash and that is why today for the workers we are some kind of arrivals from Mars” (p. 165). Piotr Marcau offers a similarly bitter observation about contemporary workers: „They don’t give a damn about national culture and this is yet another difference between Belarusians and citizens of Baltic Republics” (p. 189). There are more comparisons to Balts:. „Buying books in Belarusian — states Aleh Trusau, president of the Belarusian Language Society — was not prohibited by anybody. Unfortunately, we have a problem of mentality. Lithuanians, for instance, would never buy their authors in Russian whereas Belarusians did” (p. 116). The disappointment which intellectuals felt for the common people is what distinguished Belarusians from Poles, but also from the Russians, whose former elites had a sense of unfulfilled duty toward their common people but also a sense of noble superiority toward them.
The account of Pavel Sevarynec, the leader of the opposition Youth Front, from his stay in a village in north-east Belarus, where he was sentenced by the court, is clearly of anecdotal and sociological character:
„Do the inhabitants of the village consider themselves Belarusians — ask Polish journalists — or Russians? Or is there is national identification among them?
In Maloye Sitno — answers Sevarynec — most of the people will answer: I am Belarusian, but the situation is quite complicated there. There is a woman living there, for instance, and her name is Pavlovna. In her ID it is Olena Pavlovna, because she was born in Ukraine. For a long time, when she lived with her family in the Far East, somewhere on the Pacific Coast, she considered herself a Russian and signed her name as Yelena Pavlovna. When she came to Belarus, she became Alena Pavlovna. During the Orange Revolution in Ukraine she felt proud of the developments in Kiev and would say: I am Ukrainian, after all I was born in Ukraine. Viktor Yushchenko is my president, I belong to the orange camp. Razom nas bahato. She became Olena again. However, after the crisis began in Ukraine and Yushchenko turned out not to be strong enough, she came to the conclusion that her president was Vladimir Putin. She said she was from Russia and that we could not even imagine what a real ocean looked like because in Belarus we have only our lakes, resembling puddles. There in Russia we have (natural) gas and even the woods are better, much better than what you have here — she used to say, asking people to call her Yelena of course…
However, when the gas crisis between Belarus and Russia broke out, she stated My president is Lukashenka, I am Alena Pavlovna, I am Belarusian. How could one think I am either Ukrainian or Russian.
Such behavior may be considered to be the strength or weakness of Belarusian character, but is typical of this country. Many inhabitants talk about themselves as Russians [RR: in original it is probably Russkiye]. It may also be determined by their religion” (pp. 147-148).
The above words correspond with the statement of Andrey Lakhovich, an independent Belarusian political scientist and analyst. Lukashenka used to claim — Lakhovich says — that Belarusians, Ukrainians and Poles are one nation. Now he says that we are a separate branch, despite the fact that we come from one trunk. And this is a difference (p. 177). This kind of thinking about people’s own sense of communality can be found in the results of the sociological research conducted by an independent research institution (NISEPI) in August 2008. 65,7% responses to the question „Are Belarusians, Russians and Ukrainians different nations (народы) or three branches of one nation?” was that it is three branches of one nation. In the same study 41,5% of the respondents stated that Belarusians did not differ from Russians and that was the answer given most often.3
The opinions of Belarusian intellectuals about such findings and, particularly, about the development of national identity, leads no doubt to frustration. One of them emphases the cultural and national „clash” „between Belarusian humanists and industrial elites” (p. 161). „Mathematicians, physicists, engineers, plant managers and cosmonauts did not necessarily have to be Belarusian, and even if they were, they did not pay much attention to their origin” (p. 161). Humanists — to complete the above deliberations — were, for obvious reasons, more likely to promote high culture in their country, including Belarusian culture. The problem, however, was that it was so called „technical intelligence,” representing sciences and not humanities (which area was strongly ideologically controlled) that was more open to the world, knew its reality better and was less politically indoctrinated in the country that formally regained its independence two decades before. The results of this are still strongly felt in Belarusian universities (and other places too). According to Akudovich: „Many intellectuals gave up completely any efforts of engaging in opposition activities” (p. 163). The atomization of the community is developing. „I would not even venture to say that the factor uniting intellectuals is the need for changes” (p. 163).
Referring to the roots of forming of the modern Belarusian nation, Akudovich speaks very directly, which confirms the non-conformism of one of the most important contemporary Belarusian intellectuals: „The Belarusian nation — as he rightly observes — was, according to me, created by outsiders, not unlike me, who came from other cultures. All the great achievements in the history of Belarus and all the important events happened thanks to outsiders or with their participation. About a hundred years ago their lives coincided with the development of national ideas. In Belarus the process was conducted by people who would not have become outstanding persons in Poland or in Russia, e.g. Francishak Bahushewich or Yanka Kupala. They realized they would not be able to achieve in the Polish culture what others had achieved before, whereas Belarus was for them tabula rasa. In filling those blank sheets they found a goal that united them” (p. 162). National ideology before the war was created for Orthodox people mainly by Catholics of occidentalist orientation, which was one of the reasons for its failure. After the period of Belarusization in the 1920s what followed was Stalinist repressions of the following decade, as a result of which, as Akudovich states, „only one, technical editor, from all the editors of Belarusian encyclopedia remained alive” (p. 160). He also expresses an interesting view about the lack of analogy between the Polish „Solidarity” movement and the Belarusian reality of the perestroika period and years that followed. He points to the lack among Belarusians of Polish-like Solidarity elites that existed in Poland before 1980. Besides, no movement uniting workers and intellectuals developed in Belarus. And Poland was different from Belarus because its schools taught a common cultural cannon, where Mickiewicz and Słowacki were read. Appealing to workers, intellectuals could refer to this shared knowledge (pp. 164-165).
The author raises here a very important problem, namely the discrepancy between nationalized Belarusian elites and social masses. It resulted from the incomplete and unequal level of nationalizing Belarusians. The Polish peasant, worker and intellectual — despite the fact that their class goals were different — were united, for several generations, by common national ideas and culture, by emotional values very important for them, which helped to develop Polish communality (also Czech, Hungarian and Lithuania). Belarusians are much more united by Sovietism than national ideas, associated by the majority of them with nationalism as a symbol of evil and strangeness. Pavel Yakubovich, the sovietized editor-in-chief of the presidential newspaper „Belarus’ Segodnia” (former „Sovetskaya Belorussiya”) can find common ground much faster with a Belarusian peasant and worker than Aleh Trusau, emphasizing his national Belarusianness and using Belarusian language and thus alien to them. „Intellectuals -Akudovich states — are of course in some way in touch with each other, but they do not try to get in touch with the nation” (p. 165). One should realize the social and psychological context of these words (and also the exaggeration included there). Building Polish national communality, Polish intelligentsia imposed on the people such systems of values and hierarchies that went beyond class divisions; putting themselves on top of such a constructed edifice, Polish intelligentsia felt a sense of success. Becoming an intellectual was until the end of Polish People’s Republic the dream of socially advancing common masses. Members of Belarusian intelligentsia — or, as some prefer, intellectuals — managed to achieve that to a very small degree.
Belarusian intelligentsia — according to Akudovich — denied its own sense of existence. He believes that „here, in Belarus, we, members of intelligentsia, exist for ourselves. That is why we are small islands. And the whole Belarus sea that surrounds us consists of a completely different substance. Besides, the islands where the intellectuals live get farther and farther away from each other.
In 1990s there appeared Zyanon Paznyak. At that time he was a very expressive, sometimes exaggerated person. But he made the same mistake Belarusian poets did in the 19th century. Those poets idealized peasants and were not able to establish contacts with those „real” peasants who lived close to them, and Paznyak idealized the whole nation. He believed that Belarusians were a true European nation and he expected such an attitude from them. But the nation did not understand Paznyak and finally turned away from him” (p. 165).
This discrepancy is understandable to a Polish person familiar with Belarusian society. The Belarusians going beyond the reality of their country also sometimes perceive that the communality in their country is slightly weaker and different than in other countries in Europe. Advancing socially when modern societies were forming, a Pole, Hungarian or Spaniard dreamed of becoming part of the elite culture, considered better, higher and more attractive, with all the class distance between him or her and the culture’s creators. In Soviet Belarus such a mechanism could never work. The traditional elites had been physically eliminated and the word „elite” had pejorative connotations among peasants and workers. In the USSR it was used in a clearly ambiguous context (p. 159). „Anything that was related to the old culture was contemptuously labeled as elitist. Of course the communists developed their elites, but until the period of perestroika the word had never been used in the Russian language. One could get punished for the stamen Bolshevik elites” (p. 159). One may assume that in Belarus the fear of strong processes of social stratification is higher than in many other European countries, the communality is weaker and the atomization of society — understood as the weakness of relations above the level of primary groups — considerable, whereas the power of national ties is lower than the competing bond with the Soviet nation. Belarusians have passed from a state structure to a class structure that has never developed completely, skipping the national level which is connected with popularizing the ideology of supra class social solidarity. Their class structure was more ideological and Soviet (based on access to power) that resulting from actual property division, which in the USSR was connected with almost complete elimination of classes standing above peasants. As a consequence of that, a well-dressed person was often perceived as a „stranger”, because during the Soviet times no representative of the people — as it was believed — would dress like that (class elitism was associated with national divisions: a Belarusian was a peasant whereas a former lord was a Pole or sometimes a Russian. This peasant and Soviet egalitarianism, despite the fact that it is getting weaker and weaker in some circles, is still present today. President’s Lukashenka’s political and ideological narrative is clearly addressed at this part of the society that shares such attitudes.
The Belarusian interviewees also point to the generational changes in the core of Belarusian identity. It is mainly the older generation that emphasizes its Sovietism, their attachment during their youth to the Soviet motherland and socialism. Some of the characters of the work referred to here have definitely departed from such views. „During the war — says Valancin Taras, a writer, translator and Soviet partisan — I never really thought about my nationality: whether I am Polish, Russian or Belarusian. I knew that my homeland was the USSR ZSRR” (p. 60). Henadz Buraukin speaks in a similar way: „Russia was our home. No one felt strange there. For the Soviet man, a real internationalist, there was no such concept as a foreign country in the USSR. Only the Balts might have thought differently” (p. 67). The younger of them, Pavel Yakubowich, considering himself a liberal now states: „I felt a Soviet man” (p. 84), and also: „The encounter with Belarusian nationalism was a new and shocking experience for me. I never thought something like that ever existed” (pp. 89-90). The testimony of Ales’ Ancipenka is of a different character: „In the mid of 1990s — says this well known Belarusian intellectual — we got familiar with postcolonial studies and realized that Belarus was a typical colony; however, some Belarusians in the USSR did not feel they were inhabitants of a colony. They felt to be defenders and creators of the great Soviet empire. They were Soviet people and they believed that they owed their professional career and standard of life to the USSR” (p. 102).
Belarusian intellectuals also point to historical reasons for such weak national Belarusianness in the 20th century. Lavon Barshcheuski, a translator, literary scholar and one of the leading opposition politicians, defines the scope of influence of the Belarusian national movement in the so-called Nasha Niva period (1906-1915). „Around 100 persons — says the current president of Belarusian People’s Front — were intellectually and literally active. Whereas during these ten years there were several thousand correspondents of „Nasha Niva” (p. 43). He also states: „It was only during the conference of enslaved countries that brothers Luckievichs mentioned openly free Belarus as the goal of their activity. Earlier no one could predict how the war was going to develop, therefore at the beginning many hoped for autonomy as part of Russia. So was the case before 1991” (p. 42). Uladzimir Arlou, a well-known writer and journalist, a historian by education, describes the destruction of Belarusianness by Soviet authorities in the 1930s: „Moscow first wanted to win Belarusians’ support, but when it realized that some of the processes developing there as a result of liberal national policy might lead to national awakening, it undertook drastic measures. It was genocide. At one point only around ten members from the Association of Belarusian Writers were left out of several hundred members. Whereas in the Association of Russian Writers it was about 20% of them who were subject to various repressions, in the case of Belarus it was over 90%. Besides, almost the whole Belarusian elite was destroyed after the Soviets took away our language, history and its heroes, national symbols and the opportunity to create a state. People who fought for Belarusian orthography were destroyed. There were voices claiming that the characters distinguishing our Cyrillic alphabet from Russian Cyrillic are fascist characters” (pp. 21-22).
A considerable part of Arlou’s conversation with Polish journalists is dedicated to Belarusian historical awareness, the process of its continuous destruction and turning it into the Soviet way. He describes a long-term process of falsifying Belarusian history, pointing out, quite rightly, that „Soviet historiography is the inheritor of tsar historiography” (p. 11). He believes that there are two Belaruses now, differing considerably by their level of historical awareness. The first one — and one could add much more numerous — was raised against the background of Russian and Soviet myths, lies and silences. „Soviet Belarusians have no historical awareness” — claims Arlou (p. 11). Belarusians were growing up convinced that they had never had their own state and that they are — together with Ukrainians — Russians younger brothers who liberated them from Tatar captivity (which never happened in Belarus). „It was written in our manual — recalls Arlou — that Skaryna continued the work of the Russian printer Ivan Fiodorov. The problem is that Skaryna’s old Belarusian print came out in 1517, whereas Fiodorov published his first Russian book in 1564. However, our printer could not precede the Russian printer, because it was the latter that was supposed to be first. Such a policy was supported by first secretaries of Belarusian communist party” (p. 15). However, there is also the other Belarus, keeping its distance from the myth about one Rus, whose goal was to justify Russian claims to Belarusian and Ukrainian lands. According to Arlou, originally there were three separate centers of forming Slavic identity: Polock, Kiev and Novogrod (later destroyed by Moscow) (p. 13). A new generation has already grow up in Belarus and they have had a chance to learn — sometimes even at schools — about important historical facts related to Belarusian history (which does not mean that there are no clear ideological and political limitations in teaching them these days in Belarus). These days, not like during the communist times, students of Belarusian schools know the name of Efrosiniya of Polock.
Another issue that is often raised by Polish journalists and their Belarusian interviewees is Belarusians’ bilingualism and the process of abandoning Belarusian in favor of Russian. Aleh Manayeu presents the current situation: „For 15 years we have been conducting a study asking the following question: What language do you use in everyday contacts?. It turns out that 6,8% of the respondents speak Belarusian, 56,7% of them speak Russian, 16,6% use both languages, whereas trasyanka is used on an everyday basis by 19% of the respondents. The figures change when we ask the following question: What language do you consider your native language?. 29,4% of the respondents state that it is Belarusian, 36,8% of them that it is Russian, and 31,2% of them state that both Russian and Belarusian are their native languages” (p. 197). One may wonder about the reasons for such discrepancies. The Russification of Belarusians before the First World War — due to Belarusians’ backwardness — was quite shallow and consisted mainly in not allowing Belarusians to form modern and national Belarusianness (Belarusians were not allowed to set up their schools, there was also a prohibition from the 1860s until the beginning of the 20th century on publishing secular literature in Belarusian). Russification was more efficient in the BSSR. To the question of why Belarusians fear to speak Belarusian, Aleh Trusau answers: „This is a genetic fear, coming from the 1930s, when people speaking this language were exterminated. When my grandmother heard me speak Belarusian, she burst out crying fearing they would kill me. For Poles the symbol of Stalinist murders is Katyń, but Katyń is outside Polish territory, whereas in Belarus every forest is Katyń. All of Minsk is built on bones. What followed after the war was the policy of Russification. All the nations had to speak Russian (…)” (p. 119).
The actual language Russification of the country took place over several decades after World War II. Non-nationalized Belarusian peasants (and in fact Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz agricultural workers) were coming into the towns destroyed by the war, meeting there educated, Russian-speaking emigrants from inland USSR, who became elites of the growing urban and industrial centers. Most of them never encountered Belarusian national ideology and what began to unite them in these cities was Sovietism, i.e. a system of values (formally class values) distancing itself from national emotions. As a consequence, Belarusian masses began in time to treat what was national as nationalistic and hostile. After Belarus gained its independence in 1991, most of the people voted for Lukashenka for president, which in fact meant choosing the post-Soviet and not European option. People were also for introducing Russian as the second national language, which in fact meant that cities would remain Russian-speaking, the area where Belarusian was spoken would become smaller and smaller and trasyanka, as a mixture of Russian and Belarusian would become more and more Russian in character, entering also the rural areas. These processes are in fact voluntary and it is mainly national elites and some youth that oppose them. The masses like listening to Belarusian songs and they treat Belarusianness as an element of folklore. At the same time they watch Russian television, read classics in Russian but also lower-level literature, as well as popular dailies, and glossy magazines. They also listen to so-called disco-polo.
The reflections offered by the Belarusian intellectuals should be completed by the statement that Belarus is becoming more dualistic than it used to be. The minority of Belarusians speaking the Belarusian language is much more vocal now (it is not very numerous but already noticeable in youth circles, often politically involved and oppositional, with most young people being apolitical), demonstrating a pro-national and often European stance. On the other hand, though, the voluntary Russification of the society is proceeding, particularly of young people, often speaking the slang of Moscow radio stations (which was never the case in the USSR). The older, Russified part of the society is still rooted in Sovietism, but a considerable part of the middle and younger generation look toward Europe, although they often do it through Moscow. The most conservative but also specifically Soviet, particularly when it comes to the social aspect, are the rural areas. Changes are still happening — which is quite clear — in the Belarusian society. Aleh Trusau notices it: „In Minsk — notices the expert of the Belarusian language — ten years ago people did not know such words as tea or coffee. Now it is only a very few cases. When I ask for sugar in a store now speaking Belarusian, the shop assistant may think for a while before she passes it to me. In the past I would have heard Please speak a human language. Minsk is changing, but so are the provinces. I visited Dzierzhynsk recently and I walked into a bank, where all the forms were in Russian of course. I filled them in Belarusian and the woman entering the data into the computer apologized to me saying that there was not character „ў”. Then, switching to Belarusian, she went on to say: We’ll insert it ourselves. The situation in the east of the country is of course worse” (p. 123). Despite the fact that the Russian language is becoming more and more popular and the pro-Russian option is much stronger in the Belarusian society than the pro-European option, the sense of Republican and national independence is growing, also when it comes to terminology. „Earlier — says Andrej Lakhovich — when I came to Eastern Belarus, where I come from, and we watched with friends a game of the Russian team, some of the viewers would shout: It’s our team playing!. Now they will say: The Russians are playing” (s. 179). The Belarusian political scientist goes on to say: „The Russian-speaking part of the Belarusian intelligentsia is convinced that language and national culture are not that important. This part of the society believes that the system in Russia is much more democratic and that with Moscow’s help they will be able to democratize Belarus. But this is only a myth. Without a national language and culture there will always remain the issue of incorporating Belarus into Russia” (p. 180).
The attitude toward language is what to a large extent distinguishes Belarusian intellectuals. Trusau opts for absolute language „Belarusization” of the society. In his statement Lakhovich seems to opt for a similar position. While attached to the Belarusian language and using the language in his writing, Akudovich doubts, taking into consideration the reality of the country, whether only Belarusian could be spoken in the area. Adam Hlobus, a Belarusian man of letters of the middle generation writes in Belarusian but also in Russian — for the money. The Russian-speaking Piotr Marcau believes that the native language for the new generations should be Belarusian. Some see the country as bilingual, which in fact means speaking mainly Russian. To Yakubowich national Belarusianness is completely alien and unambiguously associated with nationalism. It proves that the divisions in Belarus are deeper than in Poland or Czech Republic and that and that the Soviet way of thinking is not, as is the case in those two countries, a matter of the past. Perhaps the book would be more complete if a few interviews with typical Belarusian homo sovieticus had been included there, since this type of mentality, in its extreme form that can be found in Russia, Belarus or Ukraine is hardly known in Poland and could be an interesting example for many European readers as a documentary record of a certain type of mentality.
The issue of Belarusian specific mentality comes up regularly in the book. One can say that Belarusian intellectuals refer to the existing stereotype, but this is also part of their awareness and- at least to some extent — part of the observed reality. Ales’ Ancipenka made interesting observations about Belarusian mentality. His words quoted below correspond very clearly with the statement by Pavel Sevarynec also evoked here about the readiness to change the national option by the inhabitant of Maloye Sitno — Alena Pavlovna. Trying to present a characteristic feature of Belarusian mentality, Ancipenka refers to the play by Yanka Kupala „Tuteyshyya” [„The Locals], whose „plot is developing toward the end of World War I, when Minsk was passing all the time from Russians to Germans and vice versa. It is here where the Belarusian People’s Republic was proclaimed and then Bolsheviks and Poles fought for Belarus. One of the play’s heroes is hiding, trying to figure out how the situation is developing. He has several flags with him: the German, Bolshevik and Polish, red and white flag. Of course what he needs to do is hang out „the correct one” because otherwise problems may start. Kupala — Ancipenka adds — described a real situation with which Belarusians had to cope throughout the whole 20th century” (p. 103). The Belarusian intellectual believes that Belarusians adapt to social life using the strategy of mimicry, that is blending with the surrounding reality and becoming invisible to their enemies. Having a choice whether to survive or die for their ideas, the Belarusian will always go for the first option. Unlike Poles manifesting their presence, fighting and then dying, or irrationally heroic Russians, the Belarusian „will hide as long as he is certain of his victory — he will be a rational hero” (p. 109).
Other important representatives of Belarus perceive its mental dimension in a similar way. „In Belarus — according to Henadz Buraukin — one often has to do his own thing, without shouting and manifesting his policy” (p. 75). And answering the question about the general concept of Russification (in the USSR), he states: „Simple people did not accept this policy but they did not oppose it either” (p. 69). Andrej Lakhovich stresses that Belarusians do not care very much about the rule of law or great ideologies, but what they strive to achieve for themselves is a sense of security, as a result of which Lukashenka was chosen the president (p. 179). Adam Hlobus, referring to the dualistic positions that Belarusians are characterized by, offers a more ironic comment: „They had to behave like this to be able to function between two cultures, in a bipolar world. Russia had one power, one faith and one state. This was also the case in Poland. But the Belarusian will always have to wonder: Well, our capital is Minsk, but it would be great if Vilnius could be our capital too. And if not Vilnius — lthough it would be so poetic — then maybe Moscow. The inhabitants of Grodno would like to have Warsaw as their second capital. Belarusians have a peace of mind when things are duplicated. This is the case with the two languages — one is our language, the other is a back-up option. There are two poets too: there is just Kolas, but there should be Kupala too” (pp. 135-136). The Polish journalists ask: „Are all the historical tragedies happening to Belarusians the source of such an attitude?” „Absolutely — Hlobus answers. Our extreme caution comes from there and so does the need to have a back-up option and never tell the truth. And if we should tell the truth, we should always have a back-up truth, so that there are two truths” (p. 136). Undoubtedly, the above characteristics of Belarusians mentality — often exaggerated in the opinions quoted here — have their source both in the peasant roots of the Belarusian society, in the lack of elitist tradition and difficult experiences of Belarusians in the past centuries, particularly those related to Russia and, during World War II, Germany; despite the fact that no Belarusians were killed during the interwar period in the Polish Second Commonwealth, the policy of Poland toward Belarusians had its problems too.
x x x
Referring to the book as a whole, one can state that the older generation of the interviewees emphasizes its former Sovietism and lack of information, as well as ideological and political involvement, faith in socialism and closeness of the system. This is deeply rooted in them. Almost 80-year-old Valancin Taras recollects the old times: „I was filled with enthusiasm which propaganda tried to instill into us. When the great terror started in 1937 we had already been so indoctrinated as kids, that when someone from the neighborhood disappeared we were sure he had dome something terrible. They instilled in us the assumption that anything Russian was the best in the world. Most people thought that in the West, in the capitalist countries, there was a lot of poverty, unemployment and abasement. Here a new society was being built for a new man. Soviet patriots did exist in fact and they were ready to give their lives for their homeland. And almost all of them died on various fronts during World War II” (pp. 50-51). One cannot abandon several years of faith, which was often a very deep faith developing people’s structures of thinking. Their reflections on the subject are very simple, to say the least. Sometimes one feels that the process of abandoning Sovietism has been very shallow. Part of the new generation has a lot of problems confronting the vision of Belarusianness constructed in such a way.
Two worlds seem to clash in many interviews. Although it is not clearly said, the Polish interviewers seem to be aware of it to some extent and perceive it — which is quite understandable — through the perspective of clearly defined oppositions: the freedom and national world on one hand, and the Soviet one on the other. The world of older Belarusians is a mixture of attitudes and values and is quite ambiguous, combining, as an external observer can see — values that contradict one another. It is ambivalent. Belarusians have been taught by their life not to stand out too much and not to look too deeply into their history and biographies. It is a very painful process and so is denying one’s biography. One may wonder whether a whole society can leave the world by which it was shaped and with which it was happy to enter a world of completely different thinking categories. Poles have slightly similar experiences, but on a smaller scale. It does not make sense to compare the situation of Polish intellectuals in Polish People’s Republic with the situation in the former BSSR. The situation in contemporary Belarus — a more pluralistic country — resembles, to some extent, the situation in Poland several decades ago, although for many reasons this is not a good analogy. Polish intelligentsia enjoyed much more social support in the 20th century than Belarusian one does now.
The conversations with Belarusian intellectuals, despite the fact that they are not representative of the whole society, to a considerable extent help the reader to understand Belarusians, their history, culture, and present mentality. The book is interesting and reads well.
Рэзюме
У дадзеным тэксце прасочаны трынаццаць інтэрв’ю, якія далі польскім журналістам выдатныя беларускія інтэлектуалы, у большасці з апазіцыйнага асяроддзя. Гаворыцца ў іх пра Беларусь, беларусаў, беларускасць, беларускую культуру і гісторыю, тоеснасць беларусаў. Да зместу гэтай кнігі можам ставіцца дваяка. У яе выяўленая тоеснасць беларускіх інтэлектуалаў, якія засяроджваюцца на сабе і сваёй бацькаўшчыне, але тут таксама знаходзім, менш або больш суб’ектыўнае апісанне канкрэтных працэсаў, якія праходзяць на Беларусі ў цяперашні час і якія адбываліся ў мінулым. Суразмоўцы польскіх журналістаў паказваюць на выключна цяжкую гісторыю беларускага грамадства, якая давяла да таго, што працэсы фармавання нацыянальнай самасвядомасці і развіцця беларускай культуры былі моцна абмежаваныя. Сённяшняя апалітычнасць значнай часткі беларусаў выступае разам з невялікім зацікаўленнем беларускай высокай культурай, беларускасцю, якая ствараецца вузкімі беларускамоўнымі элітамі ў краі, дзе большасць жыхароў карыстаецца рускай мовай. Беларускія інтэлектуалы, прынамсі частка з іх, заўважаюць і пазітыўныя змены, якія адбываюцца ў грамадстве пасля таго, як Беларусь атрымала незалежнасць у 1991 годзе. Заўважаецца лепшае веданне уласнай гісторыі, умацаванне пачуцця ўласнай своеасаблівасці, галоўным чынам ў дзяржаўным вымярэнні, а таксама нацыянальную і моўную актывізацыю некаторых маладзёжных асяроддзяў.
Ад рэдакцыі. Сутнасць нявыспеласці беларускай нацыі зводзіцца да таго, што толькі ў Беларусі ды Расіі паншчына насіла класічна нявольніцкі характар; як вядома, рабы не ствараюць нацыю.
Ryszard Radzik, a sociologist, a professor at Maria Curie-Sklodowska University of Lublin. The author of several books about Belarus: „Między zbiorowością etniczną a wspólnotą narodową. Białorusini na tle przemian narodowych w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej XIX stulecia” [Between Ethnic Communality and National Community; Belarusians against the Background of National Transformations in East Central Europe in the 19th Century ] (UMCS MCSU Publishing House, Lublin 2000), Kim są Białorusini? [Who Are Belarusians] (Adam Marszałek Publishing House, Toruń 2002, 2003, 2004), Беларусы (Погляд з Польшчы) [Belarusians; A View from Poland], (Энцыклапедыкс, Мінcк 2002), Zmiany struktury narodowościowej na pograniczu polsko-białoruskim w XX wieku [Changes in National Structure at Polish-Belarusian Borderland in the 20th Century], Uniwersytet w Białymstoku Publishing House, Białystok 2005, (co-authored with E. Mironowicz and S. Tokć). In his research work he focuses on nation-forming processes in East Central Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries as well as the processes of forming modern societies in Belarus and Ukraine.
1 Ograbiony naród. Rozmowy z intelektualistami białoruskimi. [The Robbed Nation; Conversations with Belarusian Intellectuals] Przeprowadzili [conducted by] M. Nocuń i A. Brzeziecki, Kolegium Europy Wschodniej im. Jana Nowaka-Jeziorańskiego, Wrocław 2007, 216 pages.
2 Беларусь: ни Европа, ни Россия. Мнения белорусских элит, ред. В. Булгаков, Издательство ARCHE, Варшава 2006, 257 pages.
3 „Новости НИСЭПИ”, выпуск 3, IX 2006, pp. 57-58 (Table 24 and 25).